Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to provide an update on the status of financial management at the Department of Education (the Department) from the perspective of the Office of Inspector General (OIG). I would also like to thank the committee for its dedication to improving the management of the Department.

The Department has made improvements in its financial management and has taken significant steps toward establishing and maintaining a strong system of internal controls necessary for continued financial management improvements. The Secretary not only continues to emphasize the need to improve financial management, but also has dedicated considerable resources to this goal. We share the Secretary’s commitment to improving financial management and accountability throughout the Department’s programs and operations.

I will provide an overview of the results of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2002 financial statement audits and discuss some of our most significant additional work to help strengthen accountability in the Department.

     I.  Reports on the FY 2002 Financial Statement Audit

The OIG contracted with Ernst & Young, LLP (E&Y), for the audit of the Department’s FY 2002 financial statements. This was the fifth year E&Y conducted the annual financial statement audit at the Department. E&Y notes in its audit reports that the Department made progress during FY 2002 in some areas of financial management control, such as the implementation of a new general ledger software package at the Department level and a new financial management system within Federal Student Aid (FSA). The Department also made progress during FY 2002 on financial reporting related to credit reform. For example, it improved financial statement disclosures, monitored key credit reform accounts, began a process to study key assumptions in the subsidy models, and participated with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in a Student Loan Audit Modeling Working Group.

A. Unqualified Opinion on Financial Statements

The Department reached its stated goal to earn an unqualified opinion on its FY 2002 financial statements. The unqualified opinion covered the Balance Sheet, Statement of Net Cost, Statement of Changes in Net Position, Statement of Budgetary Resources, and Statement of Financing. The effort exhibited by the Department’s financial management staff in obtaining the opinion was substantial, but as indicated by the findings in the Report on Internal Control, much work remains to be done to achieve the Secretary’s goal of creating a permanent culture of accountability.

B. Report on Internal Control

The auditor’s Report on Internal Control identifies one material weakness and two reportable conditions. The material weakness cited is:

• Financial Management, Reconciliations and Account Analysis Need to be Strengthened.

During FY 2002, significant financial management issues continued to impair the Department’s ability to accumulate, analyze, and present reliable financial information. Specifically, the Department was not able to successfully complete reconciliations and other types of account analysis on a timely basis. For example, for portions of FY 2002, the Department was not reconciling its Fund Balance with Treasury. Although improvements were noted during the year, certain unreconciled differences remained unresolved in FY 2002. The Department’s performance of reconciliations in FY 2002 was also inconsistent. In addition, supervisory review and approval procedures over reconciliations did not appear to be adequate in all cases. For much of the fiscal year, the Department also experienced problems associated with the transition to a new financial management system implemented in FY 2002.

The Report on Internal Control cited the following two reportable conditions:

• Improvement of Financial Reporting Related to Credit Reform is Needed.

The Department needs to improve management controls surrounding the calculation and reporting of activity for the guaranteed loan liability, allowance for subsidy, and subsidy estimates. For example, E&Y found that the Department’s analyses of these estimates and the underlying data indicate that, for certain data, the estimated amounts have consistently differed from actual amounts for several years. In addition, the Department does not have significant data or historical trend analysis for the effects on credit reform estimates of consolidated loans, which have significantly increased in recent years. In another example, the Department has historically used some of the Federal Family Education Loan (FFEL) program assumptions to calculate the credit reform estimates for the direct loan program, due to the lack of historical trend analysis for the direct loan program. However, the Department’s analysis indicates that actual direct loan program trends differ from the estimates that are based on FFEL assumptions.

• Controls Surrounding Information Systems Need Enhancement.

The Department needs to implement and maintain an agency-wide security plan and strengthen controls over updating its network infrastructure to secure mission-critical systems against common security vulnerabilities and exposures. The Department also needs to establish clear lines of responsibility for information system security.

C. Report on Compliance with Laws and Regulations

The Report on Compliance with Laws and Regulations notes that the Department's financial management systems do not substantially comply with the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act (FFMIA) requirements. This is due to the weaknesses mentioned above dealing with financial management and systems security. Exclusive of FFMIA, the report discloses no instances of noncompliance that are required to be reported under Government Auditing Standards or OMB Bulletin No. 01-02, Audit Requirements for Federal Financial Statements.

D. Challenges Ahead

Critical challenges remain to be resolved in order for the Department to prepare timely and accurate financial statements on an accelerated basis, and to continue improving its overall financial management.

First, as noted in the Report on Internal Controls, the Department needs to strengthen its financial management by improving its processes for reconciliations and account analysis. Having reliable financial data that is reported in interim and final financial statements must be the culmination of a rigorous and disciplined accounting process. This same process is also necessary to ensure that timely and reliable financial management information is available for decision makers. The Department needs to perform reconciliations and detailed account analyses of all significant accounts and programs adequately, consistently, and in a timely manner to ensure accurate and useful information is readily available to decision makers. Financial data should be critically analyzed, reviewed, and well understood by management.

Second, the Department needs to ensure it has the capacity to produce interim and final financial statements for OMB on an accelerated schedule. Beginning in FY 2003, unaudited financial statements must be prepared and submitted to OMB on a quarterly basis, no later than 45 days after the end of the reporting period. Beginning with the second quarter in FY 2004, agencies are required to prepare and submit quarterly unaudited financial statements 21 days after the end of each quarter, building up to the November 15th due date for the FY 2004 Performance and Accountability Reports. The Department has established a goal for itself to issue its FY 2003 financial statement on the FY 2004 accelerated schedule, or by November 15, 2003.

Third, the Department needs to improve controls to adequately safeguard the security of its financial management systems. We have identified information technology (IT) security as a management challenge, and the Department also identified its IT Security Program as a material weakness in the FY 2002 Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act report. The Department has made progress in strengthening controls over IT processes; however, continuous effort is needed to further address control weaknesses. Specifically, the Department needs to strengthen controls over updating its network infrastructure to secure mission-critical systems against common security vulnerabilities and exposures, implement comprehensive incident response procedures, establish clear lines of responsibility for information system security, and strengthen controls over critical financial and sensitive information to prevent unauthorized access and disclosure.

     II.  Financial Management Requires Accurate Data from Recipients

Performance and results are being increasingly linked to financial reporting, and to budget and funding decisions at the Federal and grant recipient levels. For example, OMB now requires each major Federal agency to issue its annual performance report, required under the Government Performance and Results Act, and its annual financial report, under the Chief Financial Officers Act, together in a single Performance and Accountability Report. Further, OMB assessed the performance of 234 Federal programs to help inform budget decisions in the FY 2004 President’s Budget. Accurate and reliable data is also key to accurate implementation of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB), as that statute ties funding decisions to school performance.

When program performance and results have financial consequences, there is a greater risk of fraudulent reporting of performance information. Therefore, having controls in place to reasonably assure the accuracy and reliability of performance data used to measure program performance at the grantee level is critical to the financial management and financial performance of Federal programs.

The following two examples from our recent work illustrate this point.

We completed a joint audit with the General Accounting Office (GAO), the State Auditor’s Office in Texas, the Auditor General’s Office in Pennsylvania and the Controller’s Office in Philadelphia to determine if States’ Title I data were accurate, complete, valid, and timely. Accountability data measure compliance with Title I requirements used to determine whether schools are making adequate progress to improve and, under NCLB, will be the basis of funding decisions. We found a number of accountability issues that should be strengthened. For example, we found that States lack procedures and controls needed to develop and report reliable accountability information, including school improvement data.

NCLB specifies that within programs that provide education for migrant children, children who are at risk of failing or whose education has been interrupted will receive "Priority for Services." The Consolidated State Performance Report to the Department’s Office of Migrant Education for every award year requires that States indicate the "count of students served who have a priority for services (those whose schooling has been interrupted and who are failing or at risk of failing to meet state standards)." We completed an audit at the Texas Education Agency (TEA) to examine the procedures used to identify these children. We found that TEA had not established or implemented appropriate procedures to identify and target migrant children eligible for Priority for Services. As a result of its lack of procedures, TEA could not report to the Department how many children were served under Priority for Services, and consequently, the Department could not determine whether the $53 million allocated to Texas for this program was used correctly. TEA concurred with our recommendations and is implementing corrective action. We will be issuing three more State audits that have similar findings.

     III. Strong Financial Management Requires Monitoring

Monitoring is an essential component for improving the financial management of, and accountability for, Federal education expenditures. Vigorous monitoring of programs and contracts helps ensure that Federal education dollars are administered and used in the most effective and efficient manner, and is vital to assuring program success. This monitoring should include program visits and reviews of annual audits. Our work has identified deficiencies in the Department’s monitoring of its programs and contracts.

FSA is responsible for the oversight of approximately $50 billion dollars each year in the student financial assistant programs, which continue to be on GAO’s high risk list for fraud and abuse. FSA has selected "improving customer satisfaction" as one of its goals to measure its performance under its five-year plan that is required by the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 (HEA). An integral part of this goal is providing technical assistance to all customers. It is critical to the integrity and accountability of these programs for FSA to establish an acceptable balance between technical assistance and monitoring and enforcement.

During the last two years, we issued four audit reports that cited deficiencies in FSA’s oversight of schools, including a significant decrease in program reviews, lack of enforcement for schools’ untimely submission of annual compliance audit reports, inconsistent enforcement of the financial responsibility requirements, and an ineffective process for recertifying foreign schools’ eligibility to participate in the programs. In September 2000, FSA had agreed to increase on-site reviews at high-risk schools.

We also have initiated audits on nine guaranty agencies to assess the adequacy of the establishment of the Federal and Operating funds as required by the HEA. To date, we have issued six final audit reports finding that the Federal fund was short-changed ranging from $1 to $6 million. FSA concurred with our findings. None of the monetary findings had been reported by FSA, even though FSA had performed technical assistance site visits at several guaranty agencies prior to our audits. In addition, outstanding issues regarding the Federal interest in non-liquid assets remain at several of the guaranty agencies. Our ongoing audits at the remaining three guaranty agencies have identified similar findings.

Our audit evaluating the Department’s process for identifying and monitoring high-risk contracts that support Office of Education Research and Improvement (OERI) programs found the Department did not always ensure compliance with contract terms and conditions, and did not follow established regulations, policies, and procedures in monitoring contracts. As a result of these shortcomings, the Department could not ensure that the contractors were meeting the terms of the contracts. We made several recommendations for improvement and the Department has stated that it is working to develop a comprehensive action plan to improve Department-wide contract monitoring, including OERI.

Annual audits conducted by independent auditors under the Single Audit Act (single audits) and the Higher Education Act (student financial aid compliance audits) are valuable tools available to the Department to monitor its program recipients. OIG works with OMB and the Department to provide updated guidance to auditors conducting both types of audits. The Department can use the information in these audits to evaluate the program recipients’ internal controls over Federal funds and whether the funds are used in accordance with program laws and regulations. This information can also be used to identify potential problems -- recipients that may require additional monitoring and oversight, such as technical assistance, additional recipient reporting, and on-site monitoring. Our work continues to support our conclusion that the Department needs to ensure that these required audits are submitted, reviewed, and acted on in a timely manner.

For example, over the past several years, we have worked with the Department on special monitoring challenges presented by the Virgin Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Pacific Rim for Federal education programs. A common trend we noted at each of these entities was the failure of most of these grantees to submit timely single audits. Our audits, audits conducted by other Federal agencies, and single audits that were eventually provided, identified serious deficiencies in the grantee’s ability to provide program services, including internal control weaknesses in the case of the Puerto Rico Department of Education (PRDE) that allowed for the embezzlement of millions of dollars in education program funds.

Our audit of PRDE and our joint investigation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation identified over $30 million in contracts improperly awarded and an extortion scheme by which certain PRDE officials obtained more than $4 million from PRDE contractors. Our work resulted in the Federal indictment of 17 individuals on various felonies, including extortion, program fraud, and money laundering. Among those pleading guilty and receiving Federal sentences were the former Secretary and Associate Secretary of PRDE – twelve and eleven years, respectively, with an order to forfeit $600,000 and to make restitution of $4.3 million.

As a result of our work and that of the Department of Interior OIG, we identified serious financial management deficiencies in the Virgin Islands administration of Federal funds. Since 1984, the Virgin Islands either failed to submit a single audit or failed to submit one on time. As a result of the deficiencies identified, our Department declared the Virgin Islands a high-risk grantee, imposing special conditions on grants awarded to it, and in September 2002, signed a compliance agreement with the Virgin Islands that addresses numerous deficiencies.

We have issued two Alert Memoranda to the Department on the need to improve accountability for Federal funds to grantees in the Pacific Islands. We noted instances of fraud, waste, and abuse, including a theft of over $640,000 that might have been detected and prevented with consistent oversight. We reported that most grantees in the Pacific Islands have not submitted all required single audits, or submitted them one or more years after they were due. Timely submission of these audits might have detected and prevented some problems at these entities.

     III. Update on Certain Investigations

Since 1999 we have been conducting an investigation of a major fraud scheme involving 19 individuals, including eight Department employees. Elizabeth Mellen, formerly the contracting officer’s representative for the Department’s contract with Bell Atlantic, has pled guilty to federal charges of conspiracy and theft of government property. This criminal activity involved ordering numerous items for herself and several family members, some of whom also worked at the Department. She also fraudulently authorized overtime pay for contractor employees who were part of this scheme. Ms. Mellen’s action, and those of others, defrauded the government of more than $300,000 in property which included computers, printers, scanners, cordless phones and a 61-inch television, and caused more than $700,000 in false overtime to be charged to the Department.

All 19 of the individuals in this scheme have either pled guilty to Federal charges or been convicted after trial. To date, 13 of the 19 have been sentenced. Seven of the eight Department employees involved have either been removed from or have resigned their positions with the Department. On February 6, 2003, Verizon Federal Systems (the successor to Bell Atlantic) agreed to pay $2 million to settle civil claims based on false overtime charges and improper electronic equipment purchases caused by its employees involved in the scheme.

We investigated the illegal diversion of $1.9 million in Impact Aid funds from two South Dakota school districts to two private banks in Maryland. An aggressive civil forfeiture action early in the investigation resulted in the diverted funds being frozen; $1.7 million in Impact Aid funds has now been returned to the Department. Four individuals involved in this theft were indicted, and one of them pled guilty. We are continuing our criminal investigation of the illegal diversion of funds.

Our ongoing investigation related to fraudulent purchase card use led to guilty pleas by two Department employees and three employees of vendors for the Department. These individuals admitted to conspiring to use government credit cards to purchase household furniture for the Department employees’ personal use. The charging documents stated the vendor’s employees concealed the true nature of these purchases by falsely invoicing the government for the purchases of office furniture. One of the vendor employees has already been sentenced.

In September 2002, a nine-count indictment was returned charging two former employees in the Quality Workplace Group of the Department’s Office of Management with conspiracy, theft of government property, and witness tampering. In January 2003, one of the former employees pled guilty to conspiracy and awaits sentencing in April. The second pled guilty on February 21, 2003. Neither is currently employed at the Department.

The scheme, as set forth in the indictment, involved the fraudulent use of government purchase cards to obtain approximately $163,000 in money, goods and services for the employees’ personal benefit and the personal benefit of others, including purchasing furniture and draperies for their homes. The indictment also outlines the payments of over $30,000 in kickbacks paid by vendors to the two former employees. The employees directed vendors to perform work at inflated prices and to provide them with the excess money. To conceal the theft, bogus invoices were created and the two former employees falsely certified that the charges were true and accurate to obtain payment.

     IV. Conclusion

The Department has improved its financial management. For the Department to continue to improve, it must sustain its efforts. We look forward to continuing to work with the Department on its goal of improved financial management and accountability throughout Department programs and operations.

This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.